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EXTRACTS FROM Regina v. Kearley*
House of Lords
2 App. Cas. 228 (1992), 2 All E.R. 345,
2 WL.R. 656, 95 Crim. App. 88
PANEL: LORD GRIFFITHS, LORD BRIDGE OF HARWICH, LORD ACKNER, LORD
OLIVER OF AYLMERTON AND LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON
[This summary of the facts is largely from the judgments of Lord Ackner and
Lord Oliver of Aylmerton.
After raiding the premises occupied by the appellant, his wife and a lodger and
after the appellant had been arrested, police officers remained on the premises
for several hours and found a small quantity of amphetamine. During that peri-
od, either in appellant's absence or out of his hearing, they intercepted some fif-
teen telephone calls from a variety of callers. In ten of the calls the caller asked
for 'Chippie,' a nickname by which the appellant was known, and asked for
drugs. During the same period nine visitors, at least some of whom had appar-
ently telephoned earlier, came to the door of the premises seeking 'Chippie.'
Seven of these callers indicated that they wanted to purchase drugs and some at
least were carrying cash in their hands. None of these persons, with [an irrele-
vant] exception ... was called as a witness. At least two of the requests made to
police officers were from callers requesting drugs from the defendant by speak-
ers who asked for a supply of their 'usual amount.'
The prosecution offered the testimony of the police officers, who had either
intercepted the telephone calls or had received the visitors at the house, about the
telephone calls or personal visits and including the contents of the conversations
that took place. The appellant objected to that evidence on the ground that it was
inadmissible as hearsay, arguing that it was to be adduced not simply as evidence
of the fact that calls were made but for the purpose of showing (a) that drugs
were being supplied at the premises on a commercial scale and (b) that it was the
appellant who was supplying them.
Although the appellant did not testify at his trial, in his interviews with the
police he had consistently denied having anything to do with the supply of drugs,
and his counsel argued at trial that such drugs as were found at his home were
there only as a result of the conduct of defendant's wife or the lodger.
After considerable argument in the absence of the jury, the court overruled the
objection, although the judge gave a careful warning to the jury "as to the cir-
cumspection with which such evidence should be received."... The central -
indeed the only - question on this appeal is whether the evidence ought to have
been admitted.
* Craig R. Callen, ed., 1995.
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The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal .... That court dismissed the
appeal but certified the following question to the House of Lords:
" 'Whether evidence may be adduced at a trial of words spoken (namely a
request for drugs to be supplied by the Defendant), not spoken in the presence or
hearing of the Defendant, by a person not called as a witness, for the purpose not
of establishing the truth of any fact narrated by the words, but of inviting the jury
to draw an inference from the fact that the words were spoken (namely that the
Defendant was a supplier of drugs).' "]
LORD GRIFFITHS.
Unless compelled to do so by authority I should be most unwilling to hold that
... evidence [such as the calls] should be withheld from the jury. In my view the
criminal law of evidence should be developed along commonsense lines readily
comprehensible to the men and women who comprise the jury and bear the
responsibility for the major decisions in criminal cases. I believe that most
laymen if told that the criminal law of evidence forbade them even to consider
such evidence as we are debating in this appeal would reply 'Then the law is an
ass.' . . . Over a quarter of a century has passed since [Myers v. Director of
Public Prosecutions, [1964] 2 All E.R. 881, [1965] App. Cas. 1001, held that fur-
ther changes in the law of hearsay were a matter for the legislature], but no over-
all legislative review of hearsay evidence in criminal law has been attempted.
The hearsay rule was created by our judicial predecessors and if we find that it
no longer serves to do justice in certain conditions then the judges of today
should accept the responsibility of reviewing and adapting the rules of evidence
to serve present society.
... [The appellant's argument can be] encapsulated in the following submis-
sion:
'Evidence is only relevant if weight can properly be attached to it as a step
towards the proof of an issue in the case. If no such weight can be attached to it,
the evidence is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. In this case, the rule
against hearsay precluded the jury from concluding that the beliefs of the caller
(that the appellant would supply them with drugs) were in fact true. Without
such a conclusion, no weight could properly be attached to the evidence, and it
was therefore irrelevant and inadmissible.'
In Wright v. Doe d. Tatham the question to be decided was whether the testator
had testamentary capacity at the time he made his will. Those seeking to uphold
the will wished to introduce into evidence three letters written by deceased
persons to the testator for the purpose of establishing that the testator was of
sound mind.
It was submitted that the contents of the letters were such that the writers must
have held the opinion that they were writing to a sane man, and that following
precedents in the ecclesiastical courts the letters should be admitted to establish
that opinion. The judges refused to follow the ecclesiastical precedents. They
held that as an opinion as to the testator's sanity expressed by the letter-writers to
a third party would not be admissible in evidence because it would offend against
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the hearsay rule, being neither on oath nor possible to test by cross-examination,
so also the statements tendered for the purpose of inviting a jury to draw an
inference as to the opinion of the writer were likewise inadmissible.
... We are however concerned with [that argument] for it is said that evidence
of what was said by those who telephoned or called at the [flat] asking to be sup-
plied with drugs was evidence of no more than their belief or opinion that they
could obtain drugs from the appellant and on the authority of Wright v. Doe d.
Tatham to be treated as inadmissible hearsay.
I cannot accept this submission. It is of course true that it is almost certain that
the customers did believe that they could obtain drugs from the appellant, other-
wise they would not have telephoned or visited his premises. But why did all
these people believe they could obtain drugs from the appellant? The obvious
inference is that the appellant had established a market as a drug dealer by sup-
plying or offering to supply drugs and was thus attracting customers[,] ... which
was a circumstance from which the jury could if so minded draw the inference
... that he was in possession of drugs with intent to supply them to others.
... There are a number of Commonwealth cases in which evidence of tele-
phone calls made to premises to place bets have been admitted as proof that
those premises were being used for illegal gaming .... The telephone calls
established the fact that the premises had attracted the attention of a number of
customers from which it was a permissible inference that they were used for
gaming.... In my opinion these cases were all correctly decided.
[In Regina v. Harry, (1986) 86 Crim. App. 105, t]he appellant was charged
with possessing and supplying controlled drugs. He had been arrested with his
co-defendant, P, in P.'s flat. The appellant was in possession of cocaine and
allegedly admitted supplying his friends. He admitted at the trial that the flat was
a centre for drug dealing. It was the Crown's case that both the appellant and P.
were using the flat for dealing. The appellant's case was that only P. was dealing
from the premises. When the appellant and P. had been taken to the police sta-
tion an officer remained at the flat. That night and the next day there were a
large number of telephone calls. The callers asked for P., and were inquiring as
to whether there were any drugs for sale .... Counsel for the appellant sought to
cross-examine the police officers to bring out the facts about the calls. The
Crown and counsel for P. objected on the grounds that these calls were hearsay.
The judge permitted the appellant's counsel to ask the police whether there had
been a number of calls and whether any of the callers had asked to speak to the
appellant. But the judge did not permit the cross-examination to bring out the
fact that all the callers had asked to speak to the appellant P P. was acquitted and
the appellant convicted .... Lawton L.J. giving the judgment of the Court of
Appeal ... [while] regarding it as a borderline case[,] .. held that the evidence
was inadmissible as hearsay because it was being used 'testimonially.' This case
must stand or fall with the present appeal. In my view the evidence of the con-
tents of the telephone calls was admissible to prove that the callers were P's cus-
tomers and that it was P who had established a market for drugs from which the
1995]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
jury could be invited to conclude that it was P. and not the appellant who was
trading from the flat. Accordingly I would hold that this case was wrongly
decided.
I would be prepared to answer the certified question in the affirmative. It is
true that the question as drafted refers to only one customer and the strength of
the evidence lies in the fact that there were so many customers. But in order to
be able to establish so many customers as to constitute a market in the drugs cre-.
ated by the dealer it is necessary to introduce evidence of the number of individ-
ual customers which collectively can be regarded as a market .... If there had
been only one or two calls made to the premises offering to buy drugs they
would carry little weight [and might be inadmissible] ....
LORD BRIDGE OF HARWICH.
[T]o start from the proposition that evidence of a multiplicity of such
requests made at the same place and within a limited space of time must be
admissible because of their manifest probative force and to proceed from this
premise to the conclusion that the certified question must therefore be answered
affirmatively seems to me, with respect, to be a wholly illegitimate approach to
the problem and to be rendered doubly suspect by the circumstance that the con-
clusion has to be qualified by saying that evidence of a single request of the kind
referred to in the certified question, though technically admissible, ought proper-
ly to be excluded in the exercise of the judge's discretion on the ground that its
prejudicial effect must outweigh its probative value.
The first question, then, is whether the fact of the request for drugs having
been made is in itself relevant to the issue whether the defendant was a
supplier.... The sole possible relevance of the words spoken is that by manifest-
ing the speaker's belief that the defendant is a supplier they impliedly assert that
fact. This is most clearly exemplified by two of the requests made to police offi-
cers in the instant case by callers requesting drugs from the defendant where the
speaker asked for a supply of his 'usual amount.' The speaker was impliedly
asserting that he had been supplied by the defendant with drugs in the past....
When the only relevance of the words spoken lies in their implied assertion that
the defendant is a supplier of drugs, must this . . . be excluded as hearsay? ... Is
a distinction to be drawn for the purposes of the hearsay rule between express
and implied assertions? . . . Unless we can answer that question in the affirma-
tive, I think we are bound to answer the certified question in the negative.
The answer to the question given by the English authorities is clear and
unequivocal. In Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 7 Ad. & E. 313, [112 Eng. Rep.
(1837)] [the] letters.., were held unanimously by the Court of King's Bench, in
a single judgment delivered by Lord Denman C.J., and by the six judges in the
Exchequer Chamber to be, per se, inadmissible as hearsay on the issue of the tes-
tator's testamentary capacity. . . . [The] argument [of the plaintiff in error in
Wright] closely mirrors that advanced here that the quantity and quality of the
evidence of what speakers or writers have said or written which implies their
belief in a certain state of facts is so cogent as to be self-authenticating and
should be received on that ground. But the argument was emphatically rejected.
[VOL. 16:1
EXTRACTS FROM REGINA V KEARLEY
Again, . . . the recent decision of your Lordships' House in [Regina v.
Blastland, 2 All E.R. 1095 (1985),] [1986] App. Cas. 41 clearly affirms the
proposition that evidence of words spoken by a person not called as a witness
which are said to assert a relevant fact by necessary implication are inadmissible
as hearsay just as evidence of an express statement made by the speaker asserting
the same fact would be.
The next question is whether, if evidence from a police officer that he heard
one person, in the absence of the defendant, requesting a supply of drugs from
the defendant is inadmissible to prove the defendant's intent to supply on the
ground that it is hearsay, the evidence becomes admissible if the prosecution are
in a position to tender evidence relating to a plurality of such requests made at
the same place and on the same day. I know of no principle which can be applied
to render evidence of many such requests admissible, if the evidence of each one,
considered separately, would not be. Of course I appreciate the probative force
of a plurality of requests. But the probative force of hearsay evidence in particu-
lar circumstances has never afforded a ground for disregarding the hearsay rule,
as Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2 All E.R. 881 (1964), [1965] App.
Cas. 1001], to which I must later refer, amply demonstrates....
In the federal courts of the United States the law is made clear by the Federal
Rules of Evidence. I find most illuminating the most recent United States
authority to which our attention was drawn, United States v. Zenni [492 F Supp.
464 (E.D. Ky. 1980)]. This was a prosecution before a district court for illegal
bookmaking where telephone calls seeking to place bets were received by gov-
ernment agents searching the defendant's premises and evidence of the calls was
held to be admissible. In his judgment, at p. 466, Bertelsman J. refers to Wright
v. Doe d. Tatham as 'the classic case' and accepts that it established the common
law rule that the words or conduct of a person offered in evidence as impliedly
asserting a fact in issue were inadmissible as contravening the hearsay rule....
The judge's statement that the Federal Rules of Evidence 'expressly' abolished
the common law rule that implied assertions should be treated as hearsay may,
perhaps, be putting the case too high, but I do not question his conclusion that on
their true construction the relevant Federal Rules lead to that result. The signifi-
cance of the judgment, for present purposes, is that the citations from academic
writers clearly expound the only rational ground or excluding from the scope of
the hearsay rule assertions which are not express but implied by the words and
conduct of persons not called as witnesses. Put shortly, the speakers' words and
conduct are motivated quite independently of any possible intention to mislead
and are thus exempt from the suspicion attaching to express assertions and are, in
that sense, self-authenticating. This view is reflected by some English academic
writers: see, for example, Cross on Evidence, 7th ed. (1990), p. 517.
I fully appreciate the cogency of the reasons advanced in favour of a limitation
or exception to the operation of the hearsay rule which would allow the admis-
sion of implied assertions of the kind in question. But is it open to your
Lordships to modify judicially the common law rule as expounded in Wright v.
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Doe d. Tatham ... in the same sense as it has been modified legislatively in the
United States by the Federal Rules of Evidence? Such a modification would
involve not only overruling Wright v. Doe d. Tatham but also departing, in
reliance on the Practice Statement of 1966 . . . from the precedents set by the
decisions of this House in both [Regina v. Blastland and Myers v. Director of
Public Prosecutions]....
In Myers the prosecution's case was that a number of cars sold by the defen-
dant were not, as he claimed, wrecked cars which he had legitimately bought and
reconstructed, but were, in truth, stolen cars made to resemble those wrecked
cars and to which the registration, engine and chassis number plates of the
wrecked cars had been falsely attached so as to enable the stolen cars to be sold
with the log books of the wrecked cars. The disputed evidence led by the prose-
cution was that the manufacturer's records, made routinely in the course of pro-
duction, identified the cars in question as the stolen cars because they recorded
not only the relevant registration, chassis and engine numbers but also numbers
indelibly stamped inside the cylinder blocks which, in each case, corresponded to
the numbers found in the cylinder blocks of the cars sold by the defendant. The
probative force of this evidence was, of course, overwhelming; it established
conclusively that the cars sold by the defendant were the stolen cars. It was, nev-
ertheless, held by a majority of three to two in your Lordship's House to be inad-
missible as hearsay.
Lord Reid . . . cited passages from [several prior decisions] to show that in
those decisions the House had already set its face against making new exceptions
to the hearsay rule. He continued...
'... . If we are to give a wide interpretation to our judicial functions questions of
policy cannot be wholly excluded, and it seems to me to be against public policy
to produce uncertainty. The only satisfactory solution is by legislation following
on a wide survey of the whole field, and I think that such a survey is overdue. A
policy of make do and mend is no longer adequate. The most powerful argu-
ment of those who support the strict doctrine of precedent is that if it is relaxed
judges will be tempted to encroach on the proper field of the legislature, and
this case to my mind offers a strong temptation to do that which ought to be
resisted ..
[Myers] provoked the legislature to make the strictly limited amendment of the
law necessary to allow the admission in evidence of private records of the kind in
question in [that case]. Parliament did not then, and has not at any time up to the
present, accepted Lord Reid's invitation to legislate 'following on a wide survey
of the whole field' of the kind which he thought to be overdue. This may be
regrettable, but cannot, I think, justify your Lordships in assuming a more ambi-
tious legislative role.
... The operation of the hearsay rule in modem conditions is in many respects
unsatisfactory. But Lord Reid's warning that in this field of the law a judicial
'policy of make do and mend is no longer adequate' is as true today as it was in
1964. However long overdue we may feel an overhaul of the hearsay rule in
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criminal cases to be, we should not be deluded into thinking that we can achieve
it piecemeal.
For these reasons and for those given in the speeches of my noble and learned
friends, Lord Ackner and Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, I would allow the appeal
and answer the certified question in the negative....
LORD ACKNER.
Miss Goddard, for the Crown [submits that] [t]he evidence of the requests
were ... not being tendered in order to establish that the person making the
request believed that the appellant was a supplier of drugs. She accepted that the
state of mind of the person or persons making the request was irrelevant. That
must include not only his or their beliefs but his or their appetites for the drug,
the 'potential market' . . . . Miss Goddard maintained that the evidence of the
request for drugs to be supplied by the appellant tended to show that the premis-
es at which the request was made were being used as a source of supply of drugs
and that the supplier (i.e. that the person who had been supplying the drugs) was
the appellant.
The certified question confines itself to a single request .... It could only be
evidence of the state of mind of the person making the request. I can see no
basis in logic or principle for validly contending that an additional request or
requests would fundamentally alter the situation. The request or requests ...
contain neither an express nor an implied assertion that the person making the
inquiry has either obtained drugs from the premises, or from the appellant in the
past, or has been told by the appellant (or his duly authorised agent) that he, the
appellant, would satisfy his requirements (the 'potential market') for drugs if he
phoned or called at the premises. Indeed the request or requests do not contain
any factual assertion. They ask a question of the appellant - 'Will you supply
me with drugs?' - thus by inference suggesting that they believed the appellant
would supply what they requested.
Thus my reply to the certified question would simply be as follows. An oral
request or requests for drugs to be supplied by the defendant, not spoken in his
presence or in his hearing, could only be evidence of the state of mind of the per-
son or persons making the requests, and since his or their states of mind was not
a relevant issue at the trial, evidence of such a request or requests, however
given, would be irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. The jury would not be
entitled to infer from the fact that the request(s) was made, that the appellant was
a supplier of drugs.
It will be apparent from what I have already stated that the application of the
hearsay rule does not, on the facts so far recited, fall for consideration. The evi-
dence is not admissible because it is irrelevant. It is as simple as that. But in
case I have been guilty of oversimplification, let me consider the position upon
the assumption that the very nature of the request or requests carries with it a
permissible implication that the appellant was a supplier of drugs. It is only in
such a situation that the request, spoken not in the appellant's presence or hearing
and by a person not called as a witness, that the rule against the admission of
hearsay evidence falls to be considered. As was made abundantly clear by the
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judge in his summing up, there was no impediment to the prosecution calling the
persons who made the inquiries. The prosecution had decided to rely not on their
direct evidence but upon recollection of the police officers to whom they
allegedly spoke.
Because the precise scope of the rule against hearsay is in some respects a mat-
ter of controversy, there are a variety of formulations of the rule. In the current
edition of Cross on Evidence, 7th ed., p. 42, the rule is thus stated: 'an assertion
other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is
inadmissible as evidence of any fact asserted.' This formulation was approved in
your Lordships' House in [Regina v. Sharp, 1 All E.R. 65, 68 (1988),] 1 WL.R.
7, 11.
In deciding whether the rule is being breached, it is essential to examine the
purpose for which the evidence is tendered. In the opinion of the Privy Council
in Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WL.R. 965, 970 it was said:
'Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself
called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible
when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in
the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to estab-
lish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was
made.'
Such being the law. Miss Goddard frankly concedes that if the inquirer had
said in the course of making his request 'I would like my usual supply of
amphetamine at the price which I paid you last week' or words to that effect, then
although the inquirer could have been called to give evidence of the fact that he
had in the past purchased from the appellant his requirements of amphetamine
and had made his call at the appellant's house for a further supply on the occa-
sion when he met and spoke to the police, the hearsay rule prevents the prosecu-
tion from calling police officers to recount the conversation which I have
described. This is for the simple reason that the request made in the form set out
above contains an express assertion that the premises at which the request was
being made were being used as a source of supply of drugs and the supplier was
the appellant.
If, contrary to the view which I have expressed above, the simple request or
requests for drugs to be supplied by the appellant, as recounted by the police,
contains in substance, but only by implication, the same assertion, then I can find
neither authority nor principle to suggest that the hearsay rule should not be
equally applicable and exclude such evidence. What is sought to be done is to
use the oral assertion, even though it may be an implied assertion, as evidence of
the truth of the proposition asserted. That the proposition is asserted by way of
necessary implication rather than expressly cannot, to my mind, make any differ-
ence.
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and
learned friend, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton .... I... agree that if a convincing
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case can be made out for relaxing the hearsay rule's application to the type of sit-
uation which has arisen in this appeal, then it must be achieved by legislation. I
believe, however, that it is dangerous to judge the merits of the application of this
rule or any other rule concerning the admissibility of evidence in a jury criminal
trial by a visceral reaction as to its utility, the so-called 'appeal to common
sense.' As is pointed out by . . . Lord Bridge in his speech in [Regina v.
Blastland, 2 All E.R. 1095, 1099 (1985), [1986] App. Cas. 41, 54], the rationale
of excluding hearsay evidence as inadmissible, rooted as it is in the system of
trial by jury, is a recognition of the great difficulty, even more acute for a juror
than for a trained judicial mind, of assessing what, if any, weight can be properly
given to a statement by a person whom the jury has not seen or heard and which
has not been subject to any test of reliability by cross-examination. Professor
Cross in Cross on Evidence, 5th ed. (1979), p. 479 stated that a further reason
justifying the hearsay rule was the danger that hearsay evidence might be con-
cocted. He dismissed this as 'simply one aspect of the great pathological dread
of manufactured evidence which beset English lawyers of the late 18th and early
19th centuries.' Some recent appeals, well known to your Lordships, regretfully
demonstrate that currently that anxiety, rather than being unnecessarily morbid, is
fully justified.
LORD OLIVER OF AYLMERTON.
... The distinction between utterance as relevant fact and utterance as evidence
of the accuracy of what is uttered is neatly expressed in the opinion of the Board
of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Wilberforce in Ratten v. The Queen [3 All
E.R. 801, 805 (1971), [1972] App. Cas. 378, 387]:
'The mere fact that evidence of a witness includes evidence as to words spoken
by another person who is not called, is no objection to its admissibility. Words
spoken are facts just as much as any other action by a human being. If the
speaking of the words is a relevant fact, a witness may give evidence that they
were spoken. A question of hearsay only arises when the words spoken are
relied on 'testimonially,' i.e. as establishing some fact narrated by the words.'
Thus, in that case, a telephone call from the wife of the accused, who had been
shot dead by him, as he claimed accidentally, and in which she asked for the
police, was held to be rightly admitted as evidence simply of a telephone call
made by a lady in a distressed state made at a time when the accused denied that
any call was made and in the context of his contention that the shooting was acci-
dental. It is to be noted, however, that in so far as it was admissible as evidence
from which the jury could be invited to infer that the caller was being attacked by
her husband, the Board found it admissible only as part of the res gestae, i.e. as
an exception to the hearsay rule.
My Lords, to any ordinary layman asked to consider the matter, one might
think that the resort of a large number of persons to 11, Perth Close all asking for
'Chippie,' all carrying sums of cash and all asking to be supplied with drugs,
1995]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
would be as clear an indication as he could reasonably expect to have that 11,
Perth Close, was a place at which drugs were available; and if he were to be
asked whether or not this showed also that 'Chippie' was dealing in drugs, I can-
not help feeling that his answer would be 'Of course it does.' But so simple -
perhaps, one might say, so attractively common sense - a layman's approach is
not necessarily a reliable guide in a criminal trial .... Indeed, even accepting the
layman's immediate impression, if one goes on to ask 'Why do you say, "Of
course?" ' the matter becomes a little more complex. The answer to that question
has to be 'because, of course, they would not go and ask for drugs unless they
expected to get them.' But then if one asks, 'Well, why did they expect to get
them?' even the layman is compelled into an area of speculation. They expected
to get them either because they had got them before or because they had been
told, rightly or wrongly, or had heard or thought or guessed that there was some-
body called 'Chippie' at 11, Perth Close who supplied drugs....
Now if we translate that inquiry into the context of.a criminal trial in which the
accused, by pleading not guilty, is saying to the prosecution, as he is entitled to
do: 'I challenge you to prove, by relevant and admissible evidence, that I was in
possession of the drugs found at 11, Perth Close with intent to supply them,' we
have to start with the terms of the charge and ask ourselves whether and to what
extent the evidence of a police officer that he heard a number of callers to or at
the premises asking for drugs goes any way at all towards establishing that the
accused, one of the three residents at the premises, was intending to supply
drugs.
... [I]f one asks whether the fact that a large number of persons called at the
premises seeking to purchase from 'Chippie' renders probable the existence of a
person at the premises called 'Chippie' who is willing to supply drugs, the
answer can, I think, only be in the affirmative. But the difficulty here is that it is
only the combination of the facts (a) that persons called, (b) that they asked for
'Chippie' and (c) that they requested drugs, which renders the evidence relevant.
The mere fact that people telephoned or called, in itself, is irrelevant for it neither
proves nor renders probable any other fact .... So far as concerns anything in
issue at the trial, what the caller said and the state of mind which that fact
evinces, become relevant and probative of the fact in issue (namely, the intent of
the appellant) only if, or because, (i) what was said amounts to a statement, by
necessary implication, that the appellant has in the past supplied drugs to the
speaker (as in two cases in which requests were made for 'the usual') or (ii) it
imports the belief or opinion of the speaker that the appellant has drugs and is
willing to supply them. And here, as it seems to me, we are directly up against
the hearsay rule which forms one of the major established exceptions to the
admissibility of relevant evidence....
The impermissibility of [the Crown's argument] rests upon a well established
principle expounded in the context of civil proceedings some 150 years ago in
Wright v. Doe d. Tatham ....
I do not, moreover, think that the admission of the evidence of the police offi-
cers in the present case can be justified by seeking to equiparate it with the evi-
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dence of the telephone call which was held to have been rightly admitted in
Ratten v. The Queen [3 All E.R. 801 (1971), [1972] App. Cas. 378], for there, as
already mentioned, the evidence had a double relevance. The fact that a call was
made from the premises at all at that time was directly in issue and the circum-
stance in which it was made, that is to say, that it was made by a woman who was
both frightened and hysterical, was clearly material to the jury's determination of
the likelihood or unlikelihood of the accused's claim that the shooting took place
accidentally while he was engaged in the innocuous process of cleaning his gun.
That is a long way from the instant case where the conversation is relied upon
not as a circumstance surrounding an act of the accused but as indicative of the
speaker's view of the accused's intentions....
A more modem example of the impermissibility of drawing inferences from
hearsay assertions is provided by [Regina v. Blastland, 2 All E.R. 1095 (1985),
[1986] App. Cas. 41], where the accused, who was charged with murder, attempt-
ed to call witnesses to testify that a third person, not called as a witness, had stat-
ed, before the body was found, that a young boy had been murdered. That evi-
dence was tendered for the purpose of enabling an inference to be drawn, from
the knowledge of the maker of the statement of the boy's death, that he had been
responsible for it, although it was accepted that evidence of a confession of guilt
by the same persons was rightly excluded as inadmissible hearsay. In the course
of his speech ... Lord Bridge of Harwich quoted and approved the following
words of the trial judge (Bush J.)... :
'The real purpose and relevance of calling the evidence as to the state of mind is
to say that in effect that was an implied admission of the knowledge of the
crime, which is an implied admission of the crime itself and that too I regard as
hearsay evidence and inadmissible.'
If we now apply that to the facts of the instant case, what is in issue is the state
of mind of the appellant: did he or did he not have an intent to deal in drugs? Is
the existence of that state of mind in the appellant proved or rendered more prob-
able by the fact that a third person, not even proved to have been known to him,
has called at the premises where he and two other persons live and has asked a
police officer to supply drugs? I find it very difficult to see how it can be except
by treating it as an assertion by the caller to the police officer that the appellant
is a supplier of drugs, an assertion clearly inadmissible as hearsay because ten-
dered as evidence of fact. To put it another way, the circumstance of the call and
the request in combination becomes relevant only by virtue of the latter's very
inadmissibility. So one is faced with a circular and self-defeating process. The
requests of the callers cannot establish or, without more, render probable the
existence of that state of mind in the appellant. They establish only what was the
state of mind or belief of the callers, which was never in issue and which can be
relevant to the issue only if there exists and can be proved the state of mind of the
appellant, which is the very thing that they are tendered to establish.
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In the Court of Appeal ... in the instant case Lloyd L.J., who delivered the
judgment of the court, was clearly offended - as I confess I myself was initially
- at the notion that there might be withdrawn from the consideration of the jury
evidence which plainly pointed to a reputation of the premises as a place at
which drugs could be obtained and a reputation in the appellant as a person will-
ing and able to supply them. Members of the public do not normally telephone
or turn up on the doorstep with offers to purchase drugs unless they have, or at
least think that they have, good reason to suppose that their offers are likely to be
accepted....
In the Court of Appeal ... the problem was approached by treating the evi-
dence tendered as raising two separate, though possibly interrelated, questions.
First, it was asked, was it admissible solely for the purpose of proving that
amphetamines either had been or were being supplied from the premises where
the appellant lived? That was answered in the affirmative simply by reference to
Woodhouse v. Hall [72 Crim. App. 39 (1980)). Lloyd L.J., in the course of his
judgment . . . postulated the question, 'What difference could there be between
offers to sell sexual services [as in Woodhouse] and offers to buy drugs?' and
observed, at pp. 224-225:
'If the police officers could give original evidence, without infringing the
hearsay rule, that offers were made in the one case in order to establish that the
premises were a brothel, then they could give original evidence to the like effect
in the other case to establish that the premises were being used for the supply of
drugs.'
Such analogical reasoning, however, does not, with respect, stand up to analysis.
There is a world of difference between evidence by a witness of his own observa-
tion of disorderly conduct by persons employed at the premises tendered to prove
their use as a disorderly house and evidence of what a witness has heard from an
unconnected caller regarding his belief as to what goes on at the premises.
Whilst it is no doubt true that the mere supplying of drugs from premises neces-
sarily implies the existence of customers anxious to acquire them, that is not a
proposition which can legitimately be used to demonstrate the converse, i.e. that
the existence of such customers implies the supply of drugs ....
Looking once again at the terms of the charge, what was in issue was not
the [use] of the premises for supplying drugs commercially. It was whether the
appellant was in possession of drugs with intent to supply. So far as the evidence
was directed to furnishing a ground for an inference as to the [use] of the premis-
es, that [use] was relevant to the charge only so far as it was permissible to infer
from it that it was the appellant who was using them for that purpose. That in
turn could be inferred only from the words used. There was in fact only one pur-
pose, namely that of establishing the appellant's intention.
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speeches prepared by my noble
and learned friends, Lord Griffiths and Lord Browne-Wilkinson .... [Their]
argument - and I hope that I do not misstate it - is that the acts of callers in
going or telephoning to the premises, explained by their states of mind as
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revealed by their contemporaneous words, is some evidence which a jury could
properly take into account in deciding whether the appellant had an intention to
supply because it demonstrates that there was an established potential market, i.e.
a pool of willing purchasers, which the accused had the opportunity of supply-
ing. It is the relevance of this in relation to the only issue in the case - the
intention of the accused to supply that market - that I have not felt able to
accept. 'Some evidence which a jury could [properly] take into account' means
no more than that the evidence is probative. But then, one asks, of what is it pro-
bative? What is it about the existence of a potential customer or of a body of
customers, whether substantial or not, that tends to render it more or less likely
that a given individual intends to supply their requirements? Can one, for
instance, legitimately infer an intention to make a gift to charity from evidence of
calls made by collectors seeking donations?
The critical point of divergence - and I agree that it is a narrow point - is
perhaps most clearly encapsulated in the proposition that if the callers had them-
selves been called to give evidence at the trial and if their evidence had consisted
solely and exclusively of a statement that, on the relevant day, they had called at
the house and asked to be supplied with drugs, that evidence must have been
admitted. I have not felt able to accept this, for I cannot see how that evidence,
standing alone, could have any possible relevance to any issue at the trial. It nei-
ther supports nor detracts from the existence of the intention which is in issue. It
can do so only if and to the extent that it is treated as a demonstration not merely
of the caller's hope, but of his belief or opinion, that 'Chippie' is a supplier of
drugs ....
Accordingly, I for my part feel compelled to answer the certified question in
the negative.
That question, however, has been framed in such a way as to relate to a request
made by a single caller.... [C]an a substantial number of items of evidence,
each inadmissible individually, acquire by association with one another a quality
of cumulative admissibility which they do not possess individually? I find it
impossible to see how they can. If, as I believe is the correct analysis, the evi-
dence relating to each caller demonstrates no more than that caller's individual
and inadmissible belief, the cumulative beliefs of a number of callers could
demonstrate no more than the existence of a common reputation which, in any
event, would be inadmissible in evidence save on an issue of pedigree or of pub-
lic right.
The Crown relies, however, on a number of Commonwealth decisions con-
cerned with illegal gaming in which not dissimilar evidence has been
admitted.... As I have understood the judgments, the reception of evidence of
calls by persons (mostly unidentified) who were not called as witnesses was jus-
tified on the ground that an attempt by a third person to place a bet, although not
communicated to or received by the accused, was, because unlikely to be acci-
dental, logically probative of the conduct of the accused on the premises and thus
admissible to prove the use to which the premises were being put by him. Of
these cases the editor of Cross on Evidence, 7th ed., says, at p. 525:
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'A defensible line can be drawn between evidence of a call explicitly asserting
premises to be used for betting, which is hearsay and admissible neither
directly as evidence of the nature of the premises, nor circumstantially as evi-
dence of the belief of such callers; and evidence of the receipt of calls ostensibly
placing bets which is admissible directly to show that such calls were made, and
circumstantially to show the beliefs of their makers.'
I confess that I find difficulty in seeing a logically defensible distinction between
a inference to be drawn from an express assertion (viz. that that which is asserted
is true) (impermissible) and an inference to be drawn from precisely the same
assertion made by implication (permissible). That calls are made to premises is,
by itself, irrelevant, for it is probative of nothing but the fact that the calls have
been made. They have no independent relevance of their own but become rele-
vant only by virtue of the callers' purpose in making them based in turn upon
the callers' belief that bets will be accepted, which in turn is relevant only as an
assertion by the callers that the premises are used for betting....
The multiplicity of calls can go only to indicating that a shared belief is
more likely to be true than a belief held by a single person or a few people. That,
however, goes to weight or reliability, not to admissibility and it cannot in itself
make admissible that which is inadmissible.... If one supposes, for example, in
-the instant case, that instead of receiving calls the officers had received through
the letter box a sheaf of letters addressed to the appellant and saying, for
instance, 'I understand that you supply drugs. Please let me have an eighth of
amphetamine,' quite clearly such letters, in the absence of some act by the appel-
lant soliciting or adopting them, would be inadmissible, following Wright v. Doe
d. Tatham, as evidence of his intention to supply.
To admit ... statements [such as the Kearley callers'] as evidence of the
fact would, in my opinion, not only entail a radical departure from the underlying
reasoning in [Regina v. Blastland] . . . and Myers v. Director of Public
Prosecutions... and the overruling of a case of high authority which has stood
unchallenged for a century and a half but would involve embarking upon a
process of judicial legislation. ...
... I am very conscious of the difficulty of obtaining direct evidence from wit-
nesses in the prosecution of drug offences and there may well be a good case for
relaxing the rule which excludes hearsay either generally or in cases such as the
present so long as the jury receives an appropriate direction as to the circumspec-
tion with which hearsay evidence should be received. But the rule has been
evolved and applied over many years in the interest of fairness to persons
accused of crime and if it is now to be modified that should, in my opinion, be
done only by the legislature. I would accordingly allow the appeal.
LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON.
I regard [the certified question before the House] as being unfortunately
framed for two reasons. First, it raises the question of the admissibility of the
evidence in relation to only one caller, whereas in fact there were numerous
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callers. Second, the question suggests that the issue is whether the jury can draw
an inference from the words spoken by the caller, rather than from the making of
the call itself as explained by the words used by the caller. For those reasons, I
will first address the problem in the light of the actual facts of the case and at the
end revert to the certified question.
There are two questions in this case: first, whether the making of these calls
by persons seeking drugs is relevant at all to the charge that the accused had an
intent to supply. Second, if relevant, could those facts be proved by the police
officers' evidence of the calls or did such evidence breach the hearsay rule. In
my view it is critical to keep those questions separate so far as possible although
the position is much complicated by the fact that the purpose of the calls cannot
be ascertained except by reference to the words spoken by the callers.
Relevance
... [I]n my judgment the calls prove more than the opinions or beliefs of the
callers.
The evidence was, in my judgment, relevant because it showed that there were
people resorting to the premises for the purpose of obtaining drugs from
Chippie....
... Suppose a shop which has a sole proprietor and sells only coffee. Say the
issue is whether the proprietor had an intent to supply coffee. On a particular
day there was a long queue of persons at the door of the shop waiting for it to
open. Evidence of the existence of the queue would surely be admissible
towards proving an intent to supply. The presence of potential purchasers is cir-
cumstantial evidence from which a jury can draw the inference that the shop-
keeper was going to supply coffee. There can be no supply without persons to
whom supply is made: if the existence of such persons is shown, that provides
evidence of the opportunity for supply.
[It is contended] that.., the only effect of such evidence is to prove a belief in
the minds of members of the queue that the shopkeeper will supply coffee. But
although that is one of the matters which may be inferred from the existence of
the queue, in my judgment it is not the only matter which can be inferred. The
existence of the queue is a fact from which a jury could draw any one or more of
a number of inferences, viz. (1) the existence of potential buyers of coffee on that
day from that shop; (2) the belief of the members of the queue that the proprietor
will sell coffee; (3) the fact that some at least of the members of the queue are
running short of coffee; (4) the opinion of some at least of the members of the
queue that the proprietor sells good coffee, etc. Inferences (3) and (4) are wholly
irrelevant to the issue. Inference (2), though bearing on the issue, is irrelevant
because it is mere belief. But the existence of irrelevant inferences which could
be drawn does not mean that the evidence is not probative in support of inference
(1), although a judge would no doubt be careful as he was in this case to caution
the jury against drawing the wrong inferences.
In my view [defendant]'s analysis seeks to eliminate the probative fact (that
people were seeking to buy drugs) by concentrating on the reasons why they
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were seeking to buy drugs. The reasons for a third party doing an act will, nor-
mally, be irrelevant and inadmissible. Any action involving human activity nec-
essarily implies that the human being had reasons and beliefs on which his action
was based. But the fact that his action (viz. asking for drugs or queuing for cof-
fee) is capable of raising an inadmissible inference of irrelevant fact does not
mean that evidence of that action cannot be admitted with a view to proving a
relevant fact.
In my view therefore the fact that there were a number of people seeking to
buy drugs was legally relevant and admissible as showing that there was a market
to which the appellant could sell, even though such evidence was also capable of
giving rise to an impermissible secondary inference, viz. that the callers believed
Chippie supplied drugs. If the callers had themselves given evidence at the trial
and said only that on the relevant day they had made a call for the purpose of
obtaining drugs from Chippie, I can see no ground on which such evidence could
have been excluded as being irrelevant.
Hearsay
In considering relevance, I have so far assumed that it can be proved: (a) that
calls were made and (b) that the purpose of the calls was to acquire drugs from
Chippie. Unless both (a) and (b) are proved, the calls do not satisfy the require-
ments of relevance .... The only evidence of the purposes of the calls was the
police officers' account of what the callers said. Is such evidence inadmissible
on the ground that it breaches the hearsay rule?
... In my judgment that decision does not touch on this case if, as I believe,
the making of the calls in the present case is direct evidence of a relevant fact,
i.e. the existence of the potential customers willing and anxious to purchase
drugs at the premises from Chippie.
I must now revert to the certified question before this House and consider the
case on the basis that there was only one caller. Would evidence of his call alone
be admissible? In my judgment the reasoning which has led me to the view that
evidence of multiple calls is both relevant and admissible applies also to one call
alone: the caller is a potential customer. But a single call would have little pro-
bative value in showing the existence of a market. The possible prejudice to the
accused by the jury drawing the wrong inference would be so great that I would
expect a judge in his discretion to exclude it. I would also modify the question
so as to make it clear that the inference to be drawn by the jury is to be drawn not
from the words used by the callers but from the fact that there were callers who
(from the words used) were shown to be seeking to acquire drugs.
For these reasons, my Lords, I can find no reason why the evidence of multiple
calls should not have been admitted. For myself I would have dismissed the
appeal and answered the certified question (as amended) in the affirmative. In
the event, I can only express the view that there may well be a good case for the
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legislature to review the hearsay rule in criminal law. In cases such as the pre-
sent it hampers effective prosecution by excluding evidence which your
Lordships all agree is highly probative and, since it comes from the unprompted
actions of the callers, is very creditworthy. The hearsay rule can also operate to
the detriment of the accused, as the decisions in [Regina v. Harry and Regina v.
Blastland] ... both show. A review of the operation of the hearsay rule in crimi-
nal cases is long overdue.

